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Abstract
Understanding how reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions impacts climate risks
requires probabilistic projections of the baseline (“business-as-usual”) emissions. Pre-
vious studies deriving these baseline projections have broken important new ground,
but are largely silent on two key questions: (i) What are the effects of deep uncertain-
ties surrounding key assumptions such as remaining fossil fuel resources? (ii) Which
uncertainties are the key drivers of the projected emissions and global warming? Here
we calibrate a simple integrated assessment model using century-scale observations
to project global emissions and committed temperature anomalies over the 21st cen-
tury. We show that the projected emissions are highly sensitive to assumptions about
available fossil fuel resources and decarbonization rates. We find that even under an
optimistic, low-fossil fuel resources scenario, the median committed warming just by
emitted CO2 in 2100 exceeds the 1.5 degree Celsius Paris Agreement target. Across the
analyzed scenarios, the probability of exceeding the 2 degree Celsius target just from
emitted CO2 ranges from 24% to 39%. The climate-system uncertainties and decar-
bonization rates are the key factors directly driving this uncertainty. Several economic
growth parameters explain a large share of variability though their interactions.
1 Introduction
Anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions drive climate risks. Emitted carbon can remain
in the atmosphere for centuries to millenia [1]. Identifying the baseline risks associated
with climate change requires projections under a “business-as-usual” (BAU), or no-policy,
approach to continued emissions. There are several sources of uncertainty associated with
these projections, including future population growth and the degree to which economic
growth will require carbon emissions (via dependence on fossil fuel burning).
One approach to representing future emissions uncertainty is to derive scenarios which
cover an appropriate range of not-implausible futures. Scenario generation avoids the as-
signment of probabilities to various outcomes. Such scenarios can be useful, for example, to
inform exploratory modeling [2]. One downside of this approach is the lack of probabilis-
tic information, which leaves scenario users guessing about the plausibility or likelihood of
various futures [3]. The selection of which scenarios to quantify and communicate involves
implicit, though hidden, probability assessments. Sound climate risk assessments requires
probabilistic information [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Another complication in developing projections of carbon emissions is that the fossil fuel
resource base is deeply uncertain [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. We use “resources” to refer to fossil fuel
deposits which are potentially recoverable, as opposed to reserves, which are available for
profitable extraction at current prices and technologies [15]. Additional uncertainty stems
from uncertainties in fuel-specific emissions factors [16]. These uncertainties are important
when evaluating the plausibility of various climate change narrative scenarios, such as SSP5
and RCP 8.5, which make specific assumptions about the future energy mix [17, 18].
Here we produce data-driven probabilistic assessments of global population, global eco-
nomic output, and fossil fuel carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The presence of deep uncer-
tainties, such as varying fossil fuel resources or the penetration rate of zero-carbon technolo-
gies, complicates probabilistic analyses, as deep uncertainties cannot be assigned consensus
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probability values. Here, probabilistic projections under deep uncertainties are understood
as projections conditioned on a particular realization of those uncertainties. As a result, we
investigate the influence of these deep uncertain factors on the resulting probability distri-
butions through the use of scenarios. This approach allows us to understand how different
realizations of deeply uncertain factors can be expected to influence future CO2 emissions.
Previous studies differently navigate the trade-offs between two modeling objectives,
realistic dynamics and sufficiently fast model evaluations for probabilistic calibration and
tail resolution. On the one hand, models with a more detailed representation of economic
and climate dynamics (e.g. [19, 20]) may not be able to be evaluated often enough to capture
low-probability but high-risk tail areas of the predictive distribution, even with the use of
sophisticated sampling techniques. On the other hand, statistical models (e.g. [21]), can be
readily evaluated much more often, but may not be able to use mechanistic insights about
system dynamics. Our approach uses a simple integrated assessment model, which allows us
to these two competing modeling goals.
Building on the pioneering analysis in [22], our economic module uses a Solow-Swan
growth model with a Cobb-Douglas production function. Economic growth is the result of
growth in total factor productivity, labor inputs, and capital inputs, with the effect of labor
and capital inputs determined by the elasticity of production (we assume that these elastic-
ities add up to one, ensuring constant returns to scale). Emissions are determined through
a mixture of four technologies: a zero-carbon pre-industrial technology, a high-carbon fossil
fuel technology (representative of coal), a low-carbon intensity fossil fuel technology (repre-
sentative of oil and natural gas), and a zero-carbon advanced technology (representative of
renewables and nuclear). The rate of technology penetration, carbon intensities, and half-
saturation years for the last three technologies are all treated as uncertain variables. We do
not consider negative emissions technologies in this model due to critical uncertainties about
the eventual range of technologies and required regulatory frameworks [23, 24, 25]. These
unknowns make it difficult to construct prior distributions over important parameters, and
due to a lack of data, these parameters are hard to meaningfully constrain.
For model calibration, we use a Bayesian data-assimilation framework (e.g. [26]) to com-
bine prior information (including an expert assessment of per-capita economic growth [27])
with observational constraints. The Bayesian framework allows us to transparently gener-
ate probabilistic projections given a set of observations, structural assumptions, and clearly
specified prior information. The observational constraints are based on century-scale data,
from 1820-2014.
We use this modeling framework to address three main questions. First, what CO2
emissions projections are consistent with this simple model and observational constraints?
Second, how plausible are the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) and other sets
of scenario projections? Third, what are the key drivers and impacts of deep uncertainties
on the probability of achieving temperature targets? We address this last question using
scenario-based simulation and a global sensitivity analysis.
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2 Methods
2.1 Data
We assimilate globally-aggregated observations from 1820-2014. Annual population and
economic output data are from the 2018 Maddison Project dataset [28]. Economic output is
the CGDPpc series, measuring real (i.e., inflation-corrected) income per capita with current
international dollars (i.e., converting local currencies to US dollars based on their purchasing
power) [28]. Annualized carbon emissions data from 1820-2014 [29] include emissions from
fossil fuel burning, gas flaring, and cement manufacturing, and exclude emissions related to
land-use changes.
2.2 Model Structure
We use a simple model structure, typical of top-down integrated assessment models [30,
31], to facilitate the uncertainty analysis. Outputs are globally-aggregated population (in
billions), gross world product (in trillions 2011 US$), and carbon emissions (in Gt C/yr),
with an annual temporal resolution. The model generates these outputs using a set of three
coupled modules: (1) population; (2) economic output; (3) carbon emissions.1 There is a
bidirectional coupling between population and economic output: population affects labor
inputs through the labor force participation rate, while per-capita income affects the rate
of population growth. CO2 emissions are a consequence of by economic output through a
mixture of emitting technologies with varying emissions intensities.
Population
We model population growth using a logistic model [32], modified by an income-sensitive
growth rate. At time t, population Pt is given by
Pt = Pt−1
[
1 +
(
ψ1
yt−1
ψ2 + yt−1
)
ψ3 − Pt−1
ψ3
]
, (1)
where y is annual per-capita income, ψ1 is the annual population growth rate, ψ2 is the
half-saturation parameters with respect to per-capita consumption, and ψ3 is the logistic
carrying capacity. This model structure allows for interactions between per-capita income
and population growth. Note that Equation (1) implies that the population grows before
stabilizing near saturation; other projections have been made which assume population peaks
and then decreases [33].
Economic Output
To model gross world product, we use a Cobb-Douglas production function in a Solow-Swan
model of economic growth. Total world production Qt at time t is
Qt = AtL
λ
tK
1−λ
t , (2)
1We could have followed the Kaya Identity and include energy use. However, carbon dioxide emissions
are not measured but instead imputed from energy use. Including energy use would not add information,
but it would increase the dimensionality of the model.
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where A is total factor productivity, L is labor input, K is capital input, and λ is the
elasticity of production with respect to labor. Each year, total production is divided between
consumption and investment,
Qt = Ut + It = (1− s)Qt + sQt, (3)
where s is the savings rate, which we assume to be constant.
Growth in total factor productivity (TFP) occurs exogenously. The dynamics of long-
term technological change are deeply uncertain [34, 35]. Following [7], we allow for TFP to
saturate as the population ages and become less innovative:
At = At−1 + αAt−1
[
1− At−1
As
]
, (4)
where α is is the TFP growth rate and As is the TFP saturation level.
Capital stock growth occurs through a balance of depreciation and investment from the
previous time step,
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It−1, (5)
where δ is the capital depreciation rate, which is constrained to be less than the savings rate
s. Labor input is determined by
Lt = piPt, (6)
where pi is the labor force participation rate. Labor is initialized using the (uncertain) initial
population P0, while capital is initialized using the steady-state relationship
K0 =
(
sA0
δ
)1/λ
L0. (7)
Carbon Emissions
We model the link between economic output and anthropogenic CO2 emissions from fossil
fuel burning and cement production using a time-dependent carbon intensity of production.
That is, we assume that energy is a derived demand, rather than a factor of production. The
carbon emissions Ct at time t are
Ct = Qtφt, (8)
where φ is the carbon intensity. φ is modeled as a weighted average of four broadly defined
technologies,
φt =
4∑
i=1
γi,tρi, (9)
where γi,t is the fraction of the economy invested in technology i, which has a technology-
specific carbon intensity ρi. This assumes that each fuel is used uniformly across end-uses.
We set the carbon intensity of technology 1 to zero to represent pre-industrial economic
activity, which had negligible fossil fuel emissions (while human activity did produce CO2
emissions during this period [36], the primary driver of these emissions was land-use change,
which we do not consider). The carbon intensities of the technologies 2 and 3 are estimated
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from observations with the constraint ρ2 ≥ ρ3. This constraint represents the transition
from a higher carbon intensity technology, analogous to coal, to a lower carbon intensity
technology, analogous to oil and natural gas. We set the carbon intensity of technology 4 to
zero to simulate the penetration of low-carbon technologies such as nuclear and renewables.
The time dynamics of γi are approximated as logistic penetration curves,
γ1,t = 1− 1
1 + e−κ(t−τ2)
(10)
γ2,t =
1
1 + e−κ(t−τ2)
− 1
1 + e−κ(t−τ3)
(11)
γ3,t =
1
1 + e−κ(t−τ3)
− 1
1 + e−κ(t−τ4)
, and (12)
γ4,t =
1
1 + e−κ(t−τ4)
, (13)
where κ is the rate at which technologies penetrate and τi is the time at which technology
i has penetrated half the market. This type of logistic penetration model can reasonably
approximate observed energy substitution dynamics [37, 38].
To account for the non-renewable nature of fossil fuels, we impose a limit on the total
emissions from 1700 to 2500. The base-case limit is set to 6,000 GtC, as in the DICE
integrated assessment model [30]. To understand the impact of this deeply uncertainty
limit, we also consider two alternate fossil fuel resource scenarios, based on the literature:
a “low” scenario of 3,000 Gt C available from 2015 to 2500 [39] and a “high” scenario of
10,000 Gt C available over the same period [40]. The assumed resource base primarily affects
parameter τ4.
2.3 Calibration
We use Bayesian data-assimilation to calibrate the model and estimate parametric and pre-
dictive uncertainty. Bayesian statistical methods allow for the fusion of data with prior
information via Bayes’ theorem [41], yielding probabilistic parameter estimates and pro-
jections. Prior distributions represent a transparent method for incorporating exogenous
information and structural assumptions into the calibrating process (see Table S1 for a table
of prior distributions for the seventeen uncertain model parameters).
Bayes’ theorem requires the specification of the likelihood of the observations given the
model parameters. Mis-specification of the model discrepancy structure, or the statistical
distribution of model residuals, can result in biased estimates [42]. As our model outputs are
necessarily greater than zero, we construct our likelihood function using log-scale residuals.
The simplest choice is to represent the model residuals as independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noise. To investigate the validity of this assumption, we use a
differential evolution algorithm [43, 44] to find a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate. The
model fits and residuals corresponding to this estimate are shown in Fig. S3. Contrary to the
i.i.d. assumption, the residuals are auto- and cross-correlated. As a result, we use a vector
autoregressive representation for model discrepancy. We also allow for i.i.d. observation
errors in each data series. The mathematical specification of the combined error structure
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model and derivation of the corresponding likelihood function is provided in the Supplemental
Material. Prior distributions for the fifteen statistical parameters are shown in Table S2.
We use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) with the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm [45,
46] to draw samples from the posterior distribution for each modeling scenario. Four chains
are run to facilitate convergence checks. Each chain is initialized at a MAP estimate for
that scenario and is run for two million iterations. A burn-in period of 500,000 iterations
is discarded at the start of each chain. Both the chain and burn-in lengths are determined
using a combination of visual inspection and the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic [47]. Plots of the
resulting marginal posterior distributions and the pairs plot are provided in Figs. SI2 and
SI3.
3 Results
3.1 Hindcast Skill and CO2 Projections
Our model, while relatively simple, captures historical dynamics reasonably well. We assess
the hindcast skill through a cross-validation experiment. We randomly sample fifty hold-
out sets (consisting of thirty-nine years, or one-fifth the data series length). The model is
calibrated with the remaining data, and simulations for the held-out data are generated,
conditional on the calibration data. We look at the deviation of predicted to actual data
coverage for the 90% credible interval. This difference reflects the reliability of the proba-
bilistic output [48], as a projection which is neither over- nor under-confident will cover the
data at the appropriate fraction. The average coverage of the 90% credible interval on the
held-out data is 93% for population and economic output and 92% for emissions.
Using the posterior distribution from the calibration procedure, we simulate 100,000
future trajectories of population, economic output, and CO2 emissions, conditional on the
observed data. The 90% credible interval at each year, along with the marginal emissions
in 2100, are shown in Fig. 1 (the “base” scenario). Our model’s marginal yearly emissions
distribution in 2100 has a shorter upper tail than in [21]. This may be partially due to the
different data window used in their model calibration (1960-2010). When we calibrate our
model with data from 1950-2014, the resulting projections (Fig. S5) of population are more
confident than our baseline projections (possibly from missing fluctuations such as those due
to the World War 2), there is an upward increase in projected economic growth (likely from
only assimilating the post-World War 2 boom), and emissions projections are less confident.
The extended lower portion of our projections (both baseline and based on 1950-2014
data) are missing from the projections in [21] due to differences in model structure, as
we allow for substitution of a zero-carbon technology for fossil fuel-emitting technologies, as
opposed to their random-walk-with-trend approach to decreasing emissions intensity. Indeed,
median projected emissions peak in the 2050s and 2060s at around 12 Gt C/year, with a
slight reduction to 11 Gt C/yr in 2100. This median estimate in 2100 is lower than the
median estimate from [21]. Many of the posterior samples corresponding to lower emissions
involve global zero-carbon half-saturation in the first half of the 21st century, which would
require unprecedented improvements in global energy intensity [50]. We do not a priori rule
out more rapid decarbonization. Weaker prior belief that the global half-saturation of zero-
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Figure 1: Projections of carbon dioxide emissions – Projections are for four model
scenarios: a) the base scenario; b) the low fossil fuel scenario; c) the high fossil fuel scenario;
and d) the delayed zero-carbon scenario. The shaded regions are the 90% credible intervals.
Black dots are observations. The marginal distribution of projected business-as-usual CO2
emissions in 2100 is shown on the right. Marker baseline Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
(SSPs) [18] and Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) [49] CO2 emission trajec-
tories are shown for comparison.
8
carbon technology will occur in the 21st century would result in this lower mode shrinking
or disappearing. An example of this is the “zero-carbon” scenario from Fig. 1, which places
2.5% prior probability on these rates of decarbonization.
3.2 How Plausible Are Future Emissions Scenarios?
One important question is how representative and plausible the Representative Concen-
tration Pathways (RCPs) [51] and Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) [52, 53] are as
scenarios for future climate impacts under the BAU assumption. It is important to note
that unlike the RCPs, the SSPs combine emissions scenarios with a series of assumptions
related to socioeconomic development [18]. These additional assumptions influence the po-
tential consequences of climate change by representing differences in the ability of the world
to adapt to changing climate risks [52]. Fig. 1 (base scenario) shows how the CO2 emissions
associated with the RCPs and SSPs align with our projections throughout the rest of the
21st century. Tab. 1 summarizes the percentiles associated with each emissions scenario
based on projected emissions in 2100.
Table 1: Percentiles of CO2 emissions scenarios in 2100 by model scenario –
Percentiles of CO2 emissions in 2100 for each marker RCP and SSP scenario by model
scenario. RCP 2.6 is omitted as we exclude negative-emissions technologies.
Model Scenario Base Low Fossil Fuel High Fossil Fuel Delayed Zero-Carbon
RCP 4.5 18% 25% 12% 3%
RCP 6.0 64% 80% 48% 39%
RCP 8.5 97% >99% 93% 95%
SSP1 36% 50% 25% 10%
SSP2 91% 98% 84% 86%
SSP3 89% 98% 82% 83%
SSP4 57% 73% 42% 30%
SSP5 99% >99% 98% 99%
Our projections cannot capture the dynamics associated with RCP 2.6 as our model does
not consider negative-emissions technologies. While RCP 4.5 appears to be an outlier relative
to the SSP narrative scenarios, it is representative of the lower mode of the distribution, which
includes states of the world in which the penetration of zero-carbon technologies is rapid,
which can include up to 25% of the probability mass in our low-fossil fuel scenario. When
zero-carbon penetration is delayed, the lower mode disappears (see Fig. 1 and Tab. 1). RCP
6.0 is more representative of the central mode of the distribution, which includes states of
the world with slower decarbonization as well as slower levels of economic growth,though the
dual deep uncertainties of fossil fuel resource availability and decarbonization rates strongly
affect the relative probability of this scenario.
The underlying socioeconomic development assumptions for RCP 8.5 involve considerably
increased burning of coal [17] (represented in our model as technology 2). Our model suggests
that RCP 8.5 is characteristic of the upper tail (beyond the 90% percentile, as in Tab. 1) of
21st century BAU emissions for most of the century, which agrees with the analysis in [21].
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Simulations in this upper tail, with emissions in 2100 greater than 30 Gt C/yr, are largely
characterized by a combination of three factors: (i) faster economic growth due to a reduced
depreciation rate of capital stock; (ii) higher median emissions associated with technology
3 (the lower-emitting of the two non-zero emissions technologies, analogous to natural gas);
and (iii) slower penetration of zero-carbon technologies. As such, while RCP 8.5 is not a best
estimate of a BAU emissions trajectory, it can serve a valuable purpose as an example of
a high-risk (if relatively low-probability) scenario. This is particularly acute as the forcings
associated with RCP 8.5 could be achieved with lower emissions than those associated with
the scenario due to uncertainties in the Earth’s carbon cycle [54].
Most of the quantitative scenarios associated with SSPs 1-4 span the central 90% credible
interval of emissions in our base scenario, suggesting that these scenarios may capture the
very likely (as used by IPCC AR5 [55]) range of 21st century CO2 emissions. The CO2
emissions associated with SSP5 are far into the tail of our model’s projections, in the 98%
or 99% percentile. This is, perhaps, not surprising given the “return to coal” assumption in
that scenario [56, 57].
One of the key assumptions in calibrating this model is the upper constraint on emissions
from fossil fuels. The amount of fossil fuel resources are deeply uncertain [11, 12, 14]. To
explore the effect of this deep uncertainty, we examine two additional scenarios: a “low-
fossil fuel” scenario, in which 3,000 Gt C are available from 2015 on, and a “high-fossil
fuel” scenario, in which 10,000 Gt C are available. The low-fossil fuel scenario is based off
the resource estimates in [39], while the high-fossil fuel scenario is based off the resource
estimates in IPCC AR5 [40]. In both cases, we use the total resource size estimate, rather
than disaggregating or limiting only to the oil/gas resource base. If only those resources
are considered (due to the way in which technologies are mixed in the emissions model),
the corresponding estimates would be lower, though, the effect of this reduction in the
available resource base should be in line with the trends from our scenario analysis. The
fossil fuel constraint primarily influences the marginal posterior distribution of τ4 (Fig. S6),
and therefore the rate at which economic growth and emissions are decoupled. The 90%
central credible intervals for the other marginal posteriors are the same regardless of the
fossil fuel scenario.
As, perhaps, expected, under the BAU assumption, zero-carbon penetration is allowed
to be delayed as more fossil fuel resources are available. The resulting impacts on projected
emissions are shown in Fig. 1 and Tab. 1. Under the low fossil-fuel scenario, the projected
marginal distribution in 2100 becomes unimodal (albeit with a long tail), as simulations
with rapid economic growth require prompt decarbonization to avoid running out of fossil
fuel resources. RCP 4.5 captures the emissions trajectories associated with these scenarios,
while RCP 6.0 is representative of future states of the world with slower economic growth,
and hence less pressure to decarbonize. The only SSPs included within the 90% credible
interval are SSPs 1 and 4, with no probability mass associated with the emissions trajectories
associated with RCP 8.5 and SSP5. This agrees with analyses which have criticized these
two scenarios on the basis of energy resource availability [14, 57]. Even if coal resources are
widespread, without a global “return to coal,” the important remaining resources are oil and
gas deposits, which are smaller in terms of expected emissions [39] and deeply uncertain,
particularly with respect to unconventional resources [11, 12].
On the other hand, when more fossil fuel resources are available (as in the high-fossil
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fuel scenario), more rapid economic growth can occur while decarbonization is postponed.
This results in a larger upper mode (greater emissions) and a longer tail, so that RCP 6.0
is almost the median scenario and RCP 8.5 is contained within the central 90% credible
interval.
3.3 What Are the Key Drivers of Temperature Anomaly Projec-
tions?
Our interest in projecting CO2 emissions is to estimate the impact of projected 21st century
cumulative CO2 emissions on global mean temperature anomalies. On very short time scales,
changes in global mean temperatures are proportional to cumulative emissions [58]. The
proportionality constant is the T ransient C limate Response to cumulative carbon Emissions
(TCRE) [59]. This linear relationship may not be the same for all levels of atmospheric
carbon, but there is evidence that it is a good approximation below cumulative emissions of
2000 Gt C [60].
Our temperature anomaly calculations are based on the HadCRUT4 dataset [61]. We
compute anomalies using cumulative emissions from 1870, relative to the average 1860–1881
global mean temperature, for symmetry with IPCC AR5 [62], Uncertainty in the TCRE is
captured using a log-normal distribution fit to the 5-95% range from [59]. The resulting
anomalies (Figure 2), which are the anomalies committed to (not immediately observed) by
cumulative emissions, are likely underestimates of the eventually observed anomalies. This
is due to our focus only on CO2 emissions, neglecting other greenhouse gases, which reduce
the carbon budgets required to achieve particular temperature targets [63]. These other
greenhouse gases have varying reduction potentials depending on gas and sector [64].
The median and 95% percentile values of cumulative emissions from 2015–2100 which
keep temperature anomalies within 1.5 degrees of the pre-industrial baseline are 603 and
865 Gt C, respectively. For a 2 degree anomaly, these values are 782 and 1220 Gt C. Under
all scenarios, the median temperature anomaly resulting from cumulative CO2 emissions ex-
ceeds 1.5◦ C. The probabilities of exceeding 1.5 degree and 2 degree anomalies are provided
in Table 2. As might be expected from Figure 1, delaying decarbonization results in substan-
tially higher probabilities of exceeding these targets without taking into account non-CO2
greenhouse gas emissions or other sources of CO2 emissions, such as land-use changes.
We use a global sensitivity analysis [65, 66] to identify the drivers of temperature anoma-
lies in 2100 resulting from 21st century CO2 emissions. Global sensitivity analyses capture
the effects of varying multiple parameters together, rather than focusing only on the impact
of changing a single parameter (Fig. 3). TCRE, as the proportionality constant between
emissions and warming, is the primary driver of temperature anomalies for the rest of the
century, which explains the relatively similar levels of uncertainty in Figure 2. TCRE does
not interact with our integrated assessment model variables, as it is an independent quantity
which summarizes Earth-system processes. In the emissions model, 21st century cumulative
emissions are largely driven by the rate of zero-carbon technology penetration, and so τ4, the
half-saturation year of this technology, is the other variable of first-order importance. This
is intuitive, as in this model, the dynamics of economic growth are mostly irrelevant with
respect to emissions once the zero-carbon technology saturates. The speed of zero-carbon
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Figure 2: Projections of temperature anomalies from CO2 emissions – Projections
of global mean temperature anomalies (relative to the 1861-1880 mean) committed to by
cumulative CO2 emissions from 1870 through the plotted year. Projections are for four
model scenarios: a) the base scenario; b) the low fossil fuel scenario; c) the high fossil fuel
scenario; and d) the delayed zero-carbon scenario. The shaded regions are the 90% credible
intervals.The marginal distribution of projected anomalies in 2100 is shown on the right.
Projections include uncertainties in climate system responses using TCRE samples from a
log-normal distribution fit to the 5-95% interval from [59]. The dashed lines correspond to the
Paris temperature targets of 1.5◦ C (green) and 2◦ C (red) above pre-industrial temperatures.
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Figure 3: Global sensitivity analysis for temperature anomalies – Plot of Sobol’
first-, second-, and total-order sensitivities for global mean temperature anomalies (relative
to 1861–1880 average global mean temperature [61]) due to emissions from 2014 through
2100. The Sobol’ analysis was based on an ensemble of model parameters jointly sampled
from kernel density estimates around MCMC samples and TCRE samples from a log-normal
distribution fit to the 5-95% interval from [59].
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Table 2: Probabilities of temperature anomalies committed by emissions through
2100 exceeding temperature targets – Probabilities of temperature anomalies (relative
to the 1861-1880 mean) committed to by cumulative CO2 emissions only exceeding targets
of 1.5◦ and 2◦ C. These exceedence probabilities are likely underestimates due to neglecting
non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions [63]. Projections include uncertainties in climate system
responses using TCRE samples from a log-normal distribution fit to the 5-95% interval
from [59].
Model Scenario P(Temp > 1.5◦ C) P(Temp > 2◦ C)
Base 58% 30%
Low Fossil 51% 24%
High Fossil Fuel 64% 37%
Delayed Zero-Carbon 68% 39%
saturation also interacts with the total emissions associated with the reduced-emissions tech-
nology (ρ3), which is the dominant technology prior to decarbonization.
Economic growth parameters can interact in important ways, as seen by the second-order
sensitivities in Fig. 3. These sensitivities measure the impact of jointly varying parameters.
For example, while the TFP growth rate α has no first-order effect on cumulative emissions,
it is the third most important parameter with respect to total-order sensitivities, largely due
to its interactions with the elasticity of production λ and the uncertain initial TFP A0. In
the absence of decarbonization, this suggests that rapid changes in productivity and higher
levels of elasticity with respect to capital are the main driver of emissions. This is due to the
saturation of the labor pool, which is the result of the logistic model used for population and
the assumption of a fixed labor participation rate, relative to continued economic growth.
This economic growth is largely driven by TFP and capital (the rate of capital depreciation
δ also has important total-order influence).
Population dynamics play only a small role in explaining the variance of cumulative
emissions, though this could be due to our global aggregation of coupled population-economic
dynamics. For example, population growth in Africa is a driver, in combination with other
dynamics such as slow rates of regional agricultural productivity growth, of future states of
the world in which policies aimed at mitigation do not reduce emissions as expected [67].
4 Discussion & Conclusions
Achieving temperature targets is a key objective of the internationally-ratified Paris agree-
ment [68]. Thus far, the reduction of “business-as-usual” emissions response to this climate
objective has been quite low in many countries [69]. It is hence important to understand the
risks associated with business-as-usual dynamics, without policies aimed explicitly at mitiga-
tion. To this end, we derive probabilistic projections of emissions using a simple, calibrated
integrated assessment model which assimilates century-scale data and expert assessments of
economic growth. Despite the simplicity of the model structure, our projections agree well
with historical growth and emissions trends.
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We quantify the sensitivity of the emissions projections to the deeply uncertain quantity
of remaining fossil fuel resources. This is largely due to the influence of this constraint on
the required speed for decarbonizing the economy. In all scenarios, the emissions trajectories
associated with RCPs 4.5 and 6.0 characterize two different “business-as-usual” modes, which
depend on the speed of decarbonization. The plausibility of RCP 8.5 emissions (which is
commonly thought of as a “business-as-usual” scenario [17]) depends on a large fossil fuel
resource base, though it is a tail-risk scenario in all of our model scenarios. One essential
note is that the forcings associated with RCP 8.5 might result from a lower level of emissions
due to carbon-cycle uncertainty. This is important, as the impacts of climate change are the
result of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, not simply from emissions. Thus,
while RCP 8.5 may not be representative of a business-as-usual scenario (unlike RCPs 4.5
and 6.0), it has value for studies of climate change impacts as a high-risk, if low-probability,
scenario.
We also show that the transient climate response to cumulative emissions and the rate
of decarbonizing the economy have the strongest direct influence on resulting temperatures.
Total factor productivity and capital input growth (and, correspondingly, the elasticity of
production with respect to capital) are also important due to their total-order influence on
economic growth. This suggests that, in the absence of rapid decarbonization, policies and
market dynamics which result in strong increases in productivity and capital growth will
result in a higher risk of worse climate outcomes.
Our posterior projections result in lower average GWP per-capita growth from 2010 to
2100 than previous work [27]. The previous study [27] considered per-capita GWP in both
its model and expert assessment, while we model population and total GWP. This modeling
difference is likely the source of the different projections, as our upper projections of per-
capita GWP are similar when we assimilate data from 1820-2014 and 1950-2014. Per-capita
growth that is stronger than our projections would result in higher emissions levels than we
obtain.
As both the upper tail and the lower mode of our emissions projections are sensitive to the
fossil fuel resource constraint, the risk of achieving temperature targets is strongly influenced
by the size of this resource base. While there is a low probability under all of our considered
scenarios that we can keep temperatures within 1.5 degrees C of 1880 temperatures, there
is a large variation in our estimated probabilities of achieving a 2 degree C target. This
probability can be narrowed by refining our estimate of TCRE, which can be constrained
more readily by observations than equilibrium climate sensitivity [70], and by obtaining
more reliable estimates of available fossil fuel resources, particularly those associated with
unconventional oil and gas deposits.
Another crucial deep uncertainty is the rate of decarbonization. Fully decarbonizing
the global economy will require a large amount of continued research and development and
technology diffusion and global action across multiple sectors. This could occur naturally
due to market dynamics or, though contrary to the business-as-usual assumption in this
study, through coordinated climate mitigation policies. As hard as rapid decarbonization
might be, it avoids the tension between economic growth and achieving climate targets.
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Supplemental Information
1 Derivation of VAR(1) Likelihood Function
Let xt = zt −M(θ)t, where zt is the observation at time t and M(θ)t is the model output at time t. We
assume a VAR(1) process for the model residuals, and that there are iid observation errors. The model for
a VAR(1) process with observation errors is:
xt = Axt−1 + wt
yt = xt + εt,
where wt ∼ N(0,W ) and εt ∼ N(0, D), with D the diagonal matrix of observation errors. We assume that
Cov(εt, εs) = 0 for t 6= s, and the same for Cov(wt, ws). Further, the process (xt) is weakly stationary with
E(xt) = 0.
The covariance of yt is
Σy = Cov(yt)
= E[(xt + εt)(xt + εt)
′]
= E(xtx
′
t) + E(εtε
′
t)
= Σx +D
And
Σx = Cov(xt)
= E[(Axt−1 + wt)(Axt−1 + wt)′]
= AE(xt−1x′t−1)A
′ + E(wtw′t)
= AΣxA
′ +W
Then
vec(Σx) = (A⊗A)vec(Σx) + vec(W )
vec(Σx) = (I −A⊗A)−1vec(W ).
The lag-h covariance is
Cov(yt, yt−h) = AhCov(xt−1, xt−h)
= AhΣx.
Then (yt) ∼ N(0,Σ), where
Σ =

Σx +D (AΣx)
′ . . . (An−1Σx)′
AΣx Σx +D . . . (A
n−2Σx)′
...
...
. . .
...
An−1Σx An−2Σx . . . Σx +D
 .
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2 Prior Distributions and Sensitivities
2.1 Default Priors
Tables S1 and S2 list the prior distributions for the model. Prior distributions are specified by their family (e.g. normal
or uniform) and a lower and upper bound. Normal-family distributions (including normal and log-normal distributions) are
specified using their 5% and 95% central confidence limits, while uniform distributions are specified using their lower and
upper bounds.
2
Table S1: Prior distributions used in calibration for the model parameters. Lower and upper bounds are absolute bounds for
uniform distributions and central 95% confidence limits for normal and log-normal distributions.
Parameter Description Units Prior
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Reference
ψ1
population growth
rate
1/year normal 0.0001 0.15 this study
ψ2
half-saturation
constant
1000$/(year capita) uniform 0 50 this study
ψ3
population carrying
capacity
billions normal 6.9 14.4 [1]a
P0 population in 1700 billions normal 0.3 0.9 [2]
b
λ
elasticity of
production with
respect to labor
dimensionless normal 0.6 0.8 [3]
s savings rate dimensionless normal 0.22 0.26 this studyc
δ
capital depreciation
rate
1/year uniform 0.01 0.14 [4, 5]
α
rate of technological
progress
1/year normal 0.0007 0.0212 this study
As
saturation level of
total factor
productivity
dimensionless uniform 5.3 16.11 [4]d
pi
labor participation
rate
dimensionless normal 0.62 0.66 this studye
A0
total factor
productivity in 1700
dimensionless uniform 0 3 this studyf
ρ2
carbon intensity of
technology 2
kg carbon/2011US$ normal 0 0.75 this study
ρ3
carbon intensity of
technology 3
kg carbon/2011US$ normal 0 0.75 this study
τ2
half-saturation year of
technology 2
year uniform 1700 2100 this study
τ3
half-saturation year of
technology 3
year uniform 1700 2100 this study
τ4
half-saturation year of
technology 4
year uniform 2020 2500 this study
κ
rate of technological
penetration
1/year uniform 0.005 0.2 [6]
a The lower bound is the peak population in the 2.5% scenario; the upper bound the 2100 population in the 97.5% scenario.
b The lower bound is the minimum of the four alternative estimates of [2, Table B-1] minus the standard deviation; the
upper bound is the maximum plus the standard deviation.
c The global average gross savings rate between 1977 and 2017 is 24% with a standard deviation of 1.1% [7]. The range
given here is consistent with that distribution.
d We use the ratio of the 2005 level to the long-term saturation level with a uniform probability density function of ±50%.
e The global average labor force participation rate between 1990 and 2018 is 64% with a standard deviation of 1.4% [8].
The range given here is consistent with that distribution.
f The best guess is obtained using A0 = Q0λ/(1 + λ)(δ/s)
λ/(1+λ)(piP0)
λ2/(1+λ).
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Table S2: Prior distributions used in calibration for the statistical parameters.
Parameter Description Units Prior
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Reference
aii
diagonal entries
of VAR
coefficient
matrix A
dimensionless normal 0 1 this study
aij , i 6= j
off-diagonal
entries of VAR
coefficient
matrix A
dimensionless normal -1 1 this study
σ1
log-scale
population
innovation
variance
(log-billions)2
log-
normal
0 ∞ this studya
σ2
log-scale GWP
innovation
variance
(log-trillions
2011USD$)2
log-
normal
0 ∞ this studya
σ3
log-scale
emissions
innovation
variance
(log-GtC/yr)2
log-
normal
0 ∞ this studya
ε1
log-scale
population
observation
error variance
(log-billions)2
log-
normal
0 ∞ this studya
ε2
log-scale GWP
observation
error variance
(log-trillions
2011USD$)2
log-
normal
0 ∞ this studya
ε1
log-scale
emissions
observation
error variance
(log-GtC/yr)2
log-
normal
0 ∞ this studya
a Log-normal distributions have log-scale means of -1 and log-scale standard deviations of 1.
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2.2 Sensitivity to Priors
Table S3 specifies alternate priors for particular parameters to detect the sensitivity of projections to the
choice of priors. These parameters were selected because they were either identified as important by the
sensitivity analysis (Figure 2) or they were not updated by the Bayesian inversion (Figure S2). The alternate
prior specifications were selected to include unbounded prior ranges (when the prior was previously uniform)
or fatter tails (when the prior was previously normal). Other priors are kept the same from the base scenario.
Figure S1 shows the projections resulting from calibrating the model with these prior distributions. In
general, the projections are identical, and the qualitative features of the marginal distribution in 2100 are
preserved.
Table S3: Prior distributions used in calibration for the model parameters. Lower and upper bounds are
absolute bounds for uniform distributions and central 95% confidence limits for normal and log-normal
distributions.
Parameter Description Units Prior
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Reference
λ
elasticity of
production with
respect to labor
dimensionless
log-
normal
0.6 0.8
s savings rate dimensionless
log-
normal
0.22 0.26
As
saturation level of
total factor
productivity
dimensionless normal 5.3 16.11
pi
labor participation
rate
dimensionless
log-
normal
0.62 0.66
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Figure S1: Sensitivity of carbon dioxide emissions projections to prior distributions – Projections
are for the default priors (Table S1 and Table S2) and an alternate set of priors (Table S3). The shaded
regions are the 90% credible intervals. Black dots are observations. The marginal distribution of projected
business-as-usual CO2 emissions in 2100 is shown on the right.
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Figure S2: Model fit and residuals under an independent-and-identically-distributed residual
assumption – Model fit and residuals of the log-model fit for MAP estimate of parameter values when
assuming that the residuals are independent and identically distributed. The lag-1 autocorrelations are 0.60
for population residuals, 0.49 for GWP residuals, and 0.94 for emissions residuals. The lag-0 cross-correlations
range from 0.13 to 0.58, and the lag-1 cross-correlations range from 0.06 to 0.54.
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Figure S3: Prior and posterior distributions for model parameters – Prior and posterior distributions
for the model parameters under the “base” fossil fuel resource scenario. Prior distributions are in orange;
posterior distributions are in red.
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Figure S4: Pairs plots for the base model calibration – Pairs plots for the model calibration under the “base” fossil fuel
resource constraint. In the lower triangle are heat maps showing the pairwise posterior densities. The main diagonal consists
of marginal posterior density plots, and the upper triangle shows the correlations between the corresponding variables.
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Figure S5: Comparison of hindcasts and projections for different data lengths – Comparison of
hindcasts and projections from 1900-2100 for the model (with base assumptions about fossil fuel resources
and zero-carbon half-saturation year prior densities) calibrated with data from 1820-2014 (red) and 1950-
2014 (blue) for: a) global population, b) gross world product, c) CO2 emissions. The ribbons are the 90%
credible intervals, and the lines are the posterior medians.
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Figure S6: Marginal distribution of zero-carbon half-saturation year by scenario – Marginal
distribution of τ4, the half-saturation year of zero-carbon technology, by model scenario.
10
SS
P3
SS
P4
SS
P1
SS
P2
SS
P5
R
CP
 6
.0
R
CP
 4
.5
R
CP
 8
.5
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 10 20 30 40 50
CO2 Emissions in 2100 (Gt C yr)
Cu
m
u
la
tiv
e
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
Model Scenario
Base
Low Fossil Fuel
High Fossil Fuel
Delayed Zero−Carbon
Figure S7: Cumulative distribution functions of emissions projections in 2100 by model sce-
nario – Cumulative distribution functions of CO2 emissions projections in 2100 for each model scenario.
Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP). and Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP) emissions values
in 2100 are displayed as dotted lines.
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